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INTERSTATE COMMERCE--CONFLICT OF STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS-
[Federal] -Plaintiff was engaged in the manufacture of process, or reno-
vated, butter, primarily for interstate commerce. Federal statutes' regulate
such manufacture, and give the Secretary of Agriculture power to inspect,
but not to seize, the materials used in manufacture, and to seize the product
whenever unwholesome ingredients are used. Defendant, an official of the
state of Alabama, acting under state pure food laws, seized at various times,
and condemned as unwholesome, packing stock butter, the raw material
belonging to plaintiff awaiting processing. Plaintiff resisted such action
on the grounds that it was an interference with the power of Congress over
interstate commerce. The lower court denied an injunction.2 Held, reversed.
Federal power to regulate interstate commerce is supreme whenever a con-
flict arises between federal and state authority. The state power exercised
was impliedly excluded by the federal statute. Cloverleaf Butter Co. W.
Patterson.3
The earliest cases under the commerce clause said, by way of dictum,
that the federal power over commerce was constitutionally exclusive.4 How-
evet, indirect impingement on the field by the state police power was held
valid.5 Taney advanced the theory of concurrent power, with the states
free to act until precluded by Congressional action.m 6 The present rule is
a compromise,7 to the effect that when the subject matter of the regulation
is national in scope, demanding uniformity of treatment, the federal power
is exclusive, but that the states may act, without discrimination, S to regulate
subjects of local importance (in the absence of Congressional action). In
some instances, the Court has substituted a "direct v. indirect burden" (on
interstate commerce) test for the "national v. local" distinction.9
1. (1902) 32 Stat. 193, c. 784; Internal Revenue Code (1939) 53 Stat.
254, 26 U. S. C. A. §2325.
2. Closerleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson (C. C. A. 5, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 227.
3. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 491. Chief Justice Stone, Justices Frankfurter,
Murphy, and Byrnes dissented.
4. Gibbons v. Ogden (U. S. 1824) 9 Wheat. 1; Brown v. Maryland
(U. S. 1827) 12 Wheat. 419; This doctrine is also set forth in Justice
Story's dissent in New York v. Miln (U. S. 1837) 11 Pet. 102, 153, and
in Justice McLean's opinion in the Passenger Cases (U. S. 1849) 7 How.
283, 399-400.
5. Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. (U. S. 1829) 2 Pet. 245; New
York v. Miln (U. S. 1837) 11 Pet. 102.
6. License Cases (U. S. 1847) 5 How. 504. Chief Justice Taney in a
dissent in the Passenger Cases reiterated [(U. S. 1849) 7 How. 283, 470-
471] the concurrent theory. The concurrent theory finds support on the
present court from Justice Black. See note 18.
7. Cooley v. Board of Wardens (U. S. 1852) 12 How. 299. Bowman v.
Chicago and Northwestern R. R. (1887) 125 U. S. 465. Rottschaefer, Con-
stitutional Law (1939) 277; 2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law (2d Ed.
1929) 768.
8. Welton v. Missouri (1875) 91 U. S. 275; Minnesota v. Barber (1890)
136 U. S. 313; see also Woodruff v. Parham (U. S. 1869) 8 Wall. 123.
9. Sherlock v. Aling (1876) 93 U. S. 99; Minnesota Rate Cases (1913)
230 U. S. 352; Lempke v. Farmer's Grain Co. (1922) 258 U. S. 50; Kansas
City M. R. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District (1914) 233 U. S. 75; Rott-
schaefer, Constitutional Law (1939) 277-284.
Washington University Open Scholarship
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
By stipulation the issue in the present case was limited to the alleged
conflict between the state and federal statutes.*0 The problem left to the
court was to decide whether Congress had by its action excluded the state
regulation in question. It is to be noted that the power was not given
to the federal agents to enforce regulations by the method in question, nor
was it expressly forbidden to the state officials. When Congress has made
regulations concerning a subject of interstate commerce, but has left certain
phases unregulated, two inferences are possible. It may be inferred that
Congress intended to "occupy the field," leaving the subject free of any
restrictions other than those set forth.1 This influence may be likened to
the early "exclusive power" point of view, with the important exception
that it is based on Congressional action rather than on Constitutional
grounds. On the other hand, Congress may have rules, leaving to the states
the power to make further regulations not in express conflict with those
rules.' 2 The latter is closer to Taney's "concurrent" philosophy in that it
extends rather than limits state power.13
When the statute does not expressly state what is intended, the Court
must adopt one or the other of these inferences. It may base its choice
on the tenor of the act, or on the preferable policy, or on a number of
factors." In the principal case, as a basis for adopting the former infer-
once, that Congress intended to exclude the state action, the majority deci-
sion finds that the state act conflicts with the "scope and purpose of the
Federal legislation."I5 The dissenting opinions gather from the words and
10. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 491, 493.
11. Southern R. R. v. Reid (1912) 222 U. S. 424; Northern Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Washington ex rel. Atkinson (1912) 222 U. S. 370; McDermott v.
Wisconsin (1913) 228 U. S. 115; Erie Ry. Co. v. New York (1914) 233
U. S. 671; Southern Ry. v. Indiana (1915) 236 U. S. 439; New York Cent.
By. v. Winfield (1917) 244 U. S. 147; Oregon-Washington Ry. & Naviga-
tion Co. v. Washington (1926) 270 U. S. 87; International Shoe Co. v.
Pinkus (1929) 278 U. S. 261; Lindgren v. U. S. (1930) 281 U. S. 38;
Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U. S. 52; Note (1938) 86 U. Pa. L.'Rev.
582.
12. Kelly v. State of Washington ex rel. Foss (1937) 302 U. S. 1;
Savage v. Jones (1912) 225 U. S. 501. A comparison of the latter case
with McDermott v. Wisconsin (1913) 228 U. S. 115 shows how narrow
the line between the two situations may be.
13. Justice Black has urged in a number of dissenting opinions that the
presumption of validity be given to all non-discriminatory state laws in
the absence of conflicting congressional action. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen
(1938) 301 U. S. 307, 316; Gwin, White, & Prince v. Henneford (1939)
305 U. S. 434, 442. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines (1940) 309 U. S.
176, 183; Barnett, The Supreme Court, the Commerce Clause, and State
Legislation (1941) 40 Mich. L. Rev. 49.
But when Congress has taken action in the field in controversy, Justice
Black seems to adopt the inference of an intent to exclude the states alto-
gether. Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U. S. 52, noted in (1941) 29
Georgetown L. Rev. 755. Also the present case, in which Justice Black was
with the majority.
14. Crawford, The Construction of Statutes (1940) chapters 18, 20-22.
15. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson (1942) 62 S. Ct. 491, 496. For
a discussion of the tendencies of the Court in interpreting the intent of
Congress to "occupy the field" see Note, (1938) 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 532.
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history of the statute, and the practical application of it, the opposite
implication.
Unless Congress, in each regulation issued, expressly states its intent
to exclude the power of the state or to allow it in the interstices of the
federal law, the courts will continue to be faced with this problem of inter-
pretation. It has been urged that the Court adopt either one of these
presumptions in order to have a uniform rule.16 In any case there is tl~e
possibility of Congress "overruling" the Supreme Court by subsequent leg-
islation. Upon several occasions decisions have been followed by statutes
which laid down a rule different from that expressed by the Court.'7 It is
interesting to note that in most of these cases, Congress has acted to
return to the states powers which the Court had taken away in construing
the statute. We may speculate as to what action Congress may take in'
connection with the instant case.'8
J. D. H.
MECHANIcs' LImNS-JUDGMENTS---STATUTE OF LiMITATIONS--Missouri].
-A sheriff, in execution of a mechanic's lien judgment, sold two lots, the
titles to which had previously been acquired by the appellants through a
sale under a deed of trust. The sheriff's sales were on July 21, 1938, in
pursuance of the executions issued upon judgments and decrees establishing
a mechanic's lien. The decrees on the lots were entered in January and
April, 1934. The appellants sought to cancel the sheriff's sale, contending
that under Missouri statutes1 the liens created by the judgments and decrees
16. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power (1940) 27 Va. L.
Rev. 1.
17. In Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. (U. S.
1851) 13 How. 518, a bridge authorized by the state of Virginia was de-
clared illegal as an obstruction to interstate commerce. (1852) 10 Stat.
112, c. 112, declared it to be a valid structure, and in Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. (U. S. 1856) 18 How. 421, the Court
recognized the effect of the statute, and reversed the former opinion. Liesy
v. Hardin (1890) 135 U. S. 100 held that a state could not prevent the
interstate sale of liquor within its boundaries in the original package. The
Wilson Act (1890) 26 Stat. 313, c. 728, 27 U. S. C. A. §121, gave this
power to the states, and in In re Rahrer (1891) 140 U. S. 545 the reversing
effect of the statute was recognized. In both of these cases, the silence of
Congress was interpreted as an intent that the field be free of state regula-
tion. Congress acted after the interpretation by the court, to express a
different intent. See also Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry.
Co. (1917) 242 U. S. 311 in connection with the Webb-Kenyon Act (1913)
37 Stat. 699, c. 90, 27 U. S. C. A. §122.
In Oregon-Washington Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Washington (1926) 270
U. S. 87 the Court inferred from an act of Congress (1912) 37 Stat. 315,
c. 308, 7 U. S. C. A. §161, an intent to exclude state quarantine regulations.
Within three months, Congress amended the act to refute this implication,
and allow the action. 44 Stat. 250, c. 135, 7 U. S. C. A. §161.
18. To date there seems to have been no effort to effect a change in the
rule set forth by the court.
1. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§1269, 1270.
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